Climatic Conditions and Internal Armed Conflict : An Empirical Study by Shiva, Mehdi et al.
  
 
Business School 
 
 
 
 
  Discussion Papers in 
Economics and Finance 
 
 
 
 ECONOMISING, STRATEGISING  
AND 
THE VERTICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM 
 
 Climatic Conditions  
and  
Internal Armed Conflict:  
An Empirical Study  
Mehdi Shiva, Hassan Molana, Andrzej Kwiatkowski 
 
Discussion Paper No 18-8  
October 2018                                     
ISSN 0143-4543 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
Climatic Conditions and Internal Armed Conflicts 
An Empirical Study 
 
 
Mehdi Shiva* Hassan Molana** 
 
October 2018 
Andrzej Kwiatkowski* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
While climatic conditions are believed to have some influence on triggering conflicts, the 
existing empirical results on the nature and statistical significance of their explanatory role are 
not conclusive. We construct a dataset for a sample of 139 countries which records the 
occurrence of an armed conflict, the annual average temperature and precipitation levels as 
well as the relevant socio-economic, demographic and geographic measures over the 1961-
2011 period. Using this dataset and controlling for the effect of relevant non-climate variables, 
our regression analyses support the significant explanatory role of climatic factors. Our results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that climate warming is instrumental in raising the 
probability of onset of internal armed conflicts and suggest that, along with regulating 
population size and promoting political stability, controlling climate change is one of the most 
effective factors for inducing peace by way of curtailing the onset of armed conflicts.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the role of climatic factors in influencing the likelihood of onset of 
internal armed conflicts. A glance through the wider literature reveals that, albeit to different 
extents, economic, sociological and geographical factors – e.g., natural resources, historical 
grievance, ethnic dominancy, rough terrain and climatic conditions – all play direct and indirect 
roles in triggering and/or prolonging internal armed conflicts. However, despite the fact that 
climatic factors feature in quite a number of studies, the existing results on their impact does 
not convey a clear message. This paper addresses this issue. Our purpose is not to single out 
climatic factors as the main, or the most important, determinants of such conflicts. Instead, we 
wish to investigate if they feature significantly and robustly amongst the potential explanatory 
variables, and to measure the extent of their influence. By doing so, we hope to contribute to 
the debate on whether climate change issues should remain on the global policy agenda.  
 The majority of studies on the climate-conflict nexus agree with the neo-Malthusian 
interpretation that sees conflicts arising as a result of scarcity brought about by climatic changes 
– see, e.g., Fischer et al. (2002) and Hertel and Rosch (2010). A relatively large share of the 
literature on intrastate conflicts puts the primary emphasises on the role of natural resources 
seeking to explain the riddle of insurgency by linking the motivation of the rebels with their 
claims on such resources.  Amongst the studies which examine the role of sociological and 
geographical factors, grievance is considered as one of the main causes of civil war: it is 
claimed that grievance is rooted in a behavioural paradigm which emphasises relative 
deprivation, social exclusion and inequality – see, amongst others, Gurr (1971), Scott (1977), 
Muller (1985) and Connor (1994). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) propose ethnic dominancy1 as 
a civil war triggering factor but also agree that the ability to ‘loot natural resources’ motivates 
rebellion.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) emphasise the facilitating role of rough terrain2, whose 
relevance as an explanatory factor had been previously highlighted by Collier et al. (2001).  
The end of the cold war and decolonisation process, which are commonly accepted as the 
greatest political destabilising events of the past century, are considered also considered by a 
number of studies. Although these events are known to have proceeded with new conflicts in 
the nations that were affected by them, evidence on their direct role in triggering conflicts is 
somewhat controversial. Fearon and Laitin (2003) explain that the correlation between these 
events and prevalence of conflict could be due to the fact that in most cases the newly formed 
independent states were financially, bureaucratically, and militarily weak, but for instance, 
Collier (2008) examines countries involved in decolonisation and does not find a significant 
pattern.    
 There is also a parallel literature on identifying causes of conflict and/or violence at the 
individual level.  Although the focus of these studies differs from ours, their analyses and 
findings can lend support to our motivation in attempting to understand whether climatic 
factors influence internal armed conflicts, especially to the extent that they could result from a 
form of collaborative aggressive behaviour fuelled by some kind of ‘perceived injustice’ – see 
                                                       
1 This is defines as a situation in which one ethnic group makes up to 45-90% of the population. 
2 This is defined as the proportion of the country that is mountainous.  
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Muller and Opp (1986) and Stott and Reicher (1998). Anderson (2001), Anderson and DeLisi 
(2011), Hsiang et al. (2013) and Prediger et al. (2014) report evidence which associates the 
psychological effects of weather fluctuations (in the short-run) and climatic trends (in the long-
run) with aggressive behaviour.  
 Despite a substantial, and ongoing, research on what provokes an armed conflict, however, 
a clear consensus on a coherent set of factors does not yet seem to exist. In particular, the role 
of climatic factors remains rather ambiguous with mixed results that vary between one extreme 
that regards them as critical and the other which dismisses them as irrelevant. We focus on 
filling this specific gap by carrying out a systematic statistical/econometric scrutiny of the 
explanatory role of variables that are commonly regarded in the literature as relevant, including 
measures of temperature and precipitation which capture the role of both the short-run, year-
to-year, change in the weather as well as its long-run, historical, trend – similar to that used by 
Anderson and DeLisi (2011). We construct and use a sample of 139 countries over the 1961-
2011 period. Our results, based on econometric analysis of regression equations whose 
dependent variable is the onset of intrastate armed conflicts, suggest that both temperature and 
precipitation play significant explanatory roles once the contribution of other relevant factors 
is accounted for. More specifically, we find that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of starting a 
new conflict increases as the average temperature rises and precipitation level falls.   
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
describes our data and empirical methodology. Section 4 provides and discusses our evidence 
and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
   
2. Literature review  
While there is not a general agreement in the literature on what motivates a rebellion, a core 
set of explanatory variables can be deduced by sifting through the existing empirical studies.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Gurr (1971) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) identify looting, 
religious reform, nationalistic and/or economic grievance, and demand of more favourable 
conditions as leading causes. Resource wealth, especially crude oil, is also thought to increase 
the probability of civil war since a resource-rich region has a strong incentive to seek a high 
level of autonomy (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) or even to go as far as wanting to form a separate 
independent state (Le Billon, 2001; Fearon, 2005). Ross (2004) distinguishes between different 
types of resources and finds that on the whole richness in fuel and nonfuel minerals and illicit 
drugs appears to be influential while other types of resource wealth – especially agricultural 
commodities – do not seem to provoke conflicts.   
 As far as the role of climate is concerned, the influencing channels identified in the literature 
are usually separated in terms of time horizon and the underlying mechanism, i.e. long-term 
climate change alters the risk factors involved while short-term climatic shocks raise the 
survival pressure; Gleditsch (2012) stresses the importance of recognising the distinct role of 
each channel. Various studies have examined the indirect effects of climatic factors which are 
exerted through, e.g., food scarcity, malnutrition and poverty. Based on their experiments in 
Namibia Prediger et al. (2014) find persistent food scarcity to increase anti-social behaviour 
and aggression. Following a birth cohort of children in Mauritius, Liu et al. (2004) analyse the 
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relationship between malnutrition and subsequent antisocial behaviour and conclude that 
malnourished children exhibit symptoms of more aggressive behaviour. White et al. (2013) 
show that a greener habitat – e.g. larger park and recreation areas in cities (whose provision is 
facilitated by more favourable climatic conditions) – reduces the incidence of aggression. 
Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Buhaug and Gates (2002) and Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) provide evidence on the impact of topological characteristics of a territory 
on facilitating or preventing an uprising.   
 A number of studies have examined the impact of sudden changes in the weather conditions: 
Hendrix and Glaser (2007) and Fjelde and Uexkull (2012) study the effect of precipitation; 
Burke et al. (2009), Buhaug (2010) and Hsiang et al. (2013) consider the role of temperature 
shocks; Raleigh and Urdal (2007) and Salehyan and Hendrix (2014) examine the impact of 
water level fluctuations; and last but not least, Bergholt and Lujala (2012) and Slettebak (2012) 
analyse the influence of natural disasters. However, the evidence presented in these studies 
does not lead to a clear conclusion about the size and significance of the estimated impact of 
climatic factors on conflicts.  For instance, Hendrix and Glaser (2007) and Fjelde and Uexkull 
(2012) report a positive effect on probability of armed conflicts, Bergholt and Lujala (2012) 
and Raleigh and Urdal (2007) find the effect to be rather small or negligible, while Salehyan 
and Hendrix (2014) and Slettebak (2012) suggest negative effects. A novel study by Hsiang 
and Burke (2014) examines 50 rigorous quantitative studies on the association between violent 
conflict and socio-political stability and deviations of temperature and precipitation from their 
norm. They use meta-analysis methodology and a broad range of aggressive behaviour from 
individual-level violence to country-level political instability and civil war and conclude “… 
the majority of studies suggest that conflict increases and social stability decreases when 
temperatures are hot and precipitation is extreme…”.  Buhaug et al. (2014) criticise this 
methodology claiming that their study “suffers from shortcomings with respect to sample 
selection and analytical coherence”.  Buhaug et al. (2014,) argue that statistical analysis which 
pool different types of aggressive behaviour “from non-violent land grabbing via urban riots 
to major civil war” that have occurred in “a wide range of spatial scales, from municipalities 
via countries to the entire world ”, and use as explanatory variables “a wide range of climatic 
events, from heat waves via excess rainfall to global ENSO [El Niño–Southern Oscillation] 
cycles”, are bound to result in inaccurate and biased estimates.  
 Although the link between temperature levels and incidence of individual-level aggression 
is not directly related to our focus, the existing findings on heat induced violence are 
worthwhile mentioning here. This is because the same underlying change in individual 
behaviour could lie at the core of inducing a collective violent action (some form of 
collaborative use of destructive forces) provided that a collective incentive existed a priori. 
Anderson (1989, 2001) and Baron and Bell (1976) find high temperature to increase the 
tendency to aggressive behaviour. Anderson (1989) reports that on average higher levels of 
individual-level aggressive behaviour and crime (e.g. murder, rape, assault, riot, wife beatings, 
etc.) are committed in hotter regions of the world. Anderson et al. (2000) estimate the effect of 
temperature on violent crime rates in different cities while controlling for the geographical 
location (southness), population size and socioeconomic status of the cities and find that a 
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higher level of violence level is likely to be committed in hotter cities. Kenrick and MacFarlan 
(1986) find that aggressive horn honking is increased in hotter temperatures only by drivers 
who do not have air-conditioned cars. Using a field experiment in which a group of Dutch 
police officers participated in a simulated burglary scenario under different conditions, Vrij et 
al. (1994) found that on the whole officers were less aggressive and less likely to draw their 
weapons in cooler temperature conditions. Interestingly, while it is acknowledged that, in 
general, people living in extreme temperature conditions – hot or cold – are likely to experience 
relatively higher levels of aggression and violence, evidence suggests that the temperature 
effect is not symmetric: low temperature conditions are found to be less provoking – see, e.g., 
Anderson and Anderson (1998). This is explained by the fact that it is easier to overcome the 
environmental aspects of low temperature and is also supported by medical research on 
fluctuations in the level of tritiated paroxetine platelet in body which is negatively correlated 
with impulsivity and aggression and is found to be reduced in higher temperatures – see 
Tiihonen et al. (1997). 
 In sum, there is already a sufficiently convincing volume of evidence on the link between 
climatic conditions and aggressive and violent behaviour in general, and the incidence of armed 
conflicts in particular. However, there is not yet a clear cut evidence on the explanatory role of 
climatic factors on internal armed conflicts. Given the importance of understanding what 
causes the latter, there are sufficient grounds for constructing an appropriate dataset that 
enables a systematically examination of a well-specified regression equation with a view to 
assess the role of specific climatic factors in predicting the likelihood of onset of internal armed 
conflicts.  
 
3. Definitions, data and preliminary evidence 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility 
that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. 
We use the conflict data provided by UCDP and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 
where an ‘internal armed conflict’ is classified as occurring between the government of a state 
and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states and is 
distinguished from an ‘internationalised internal armed conflict’ in which there are foreign 
interventions in the form of supporting one or both sides involved in the conflict.3  We shall 
use ‘internal armed conflicts’ as the dependent variable for which two main measures are 
available in the dataset: the ‘incidence’ which records the existence of an active – or ongoing 
– conflict in a country in a specific year, and the ‘onset’ which registers (in a country in a 
specific year) either the starting of a new conflict or the restarting of an old one when more 
than one year has passed since it was last recorded as being ‘dormant’. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the conflict categories in the sample and Table A1 in the Appendix lists all the 
conflicts included in our sample which covers 139 countries over the 1961-2011 period.  There 
                                                       
3 The actual data can be found at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php and Gleditsch et al. (2002) and 
Harbom and Wallensteen (2012) provide further detail. 
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are 229 occurrences of the onset which account for 4.15% of the total observations. Our 
dependent variable is therefore a dichotomous categorical variable which takes the value of 1 
if a new conflict has occurred in a country in a specific year. The ongoing conflicts in the 
sample are treated as ‘missing’ so as to avoid the confusion that would arise from the similarity 
between observations corresponding to a country-year where (i) there is a continuing conflict 
that had started before, and (ii) there is no conflict. Acknowledging the potential risk of 
truncating our sample, we believe this is the right procedure to avoid counting observations 
with an active conflict as ‘no-conflict’.4 Also, in order to avoid confusion in terminology, 
hereafter the word ‘conflict’ is used interchangeably with “the onset of an internal armed 
conflict”. 
[Tables 1] 
 
 Turning our attention to the choice of variables that influence the onset of a conflict, while 
the existing studies mentioned in the previous section provide helpful information on the 
relevance of different variables there is no consensus on a common or core set of variables.  
Hegre and Sambanis (2006) identify 88 variables that are frequently used in the literature to 
explain civil wars. They group these under 18 ‘concept’ categories and use the specification 
strategy proposed by Levine and Renelt (1992) and implemented in Sala-i-Martin (1997) to 
choose a parsimonious set of explanatory variables for their regression analysis. Subject to data 
availability, we have used the information they provide on the relevance of these variables 
(regarding the statistical robustness of parameter estimates) as the main guide in selecting our 
set of regressors. Table 2 provides the list and definition of our non-climatic variables whose 
expected explanatory role and the way they have featured in other studies is briefly explained 
below:   
Political Instability is expected to have a negative and direct influence on the onset of conflicts 
as well as exerting an indirect effect via its impact on economic performance (see, e.g., Alesina 
et al., 1996), and has been measured in different ways. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
and Collier and Rohner (2008) use a dummy variable which takes the value of unity for those 
country-year observations in which there has been a substantial political change. We construct 
our measure following the method proposed by Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and use a decay 
function of the Regime Durability which corresponds to the length of time since the most recent 
regime change – and is defined by a three-point change in the Polity score over a period of 
three years or less. We use Polity IV data to construct our series – see Marshall and Jaggers 
(2002) and Marshall and Gurr (2013) for details.  
Peace Fragility is inversely related to the length of time during which a country has not 
experienced any conflicts and is therefore expected to have a positive effect. On the whole, the 
length of peace period is considered as one of the main influencing factors in the literature. 
                                                       
4 This method has been widely used in the literature by some of the most established scholars such as Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006). The alternative, treating ongoing conflicts as ‘no conflict’, has 
been tested in robustness checks. 
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Collier (2008) explains this using the concept of ‘conflict trap’ deduced from the evidence that 
a country has a higher risk of starting another conflict in the post-conflict period. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) highlight the positive role of conflict-free years in keeping peace in the long 
run – see also Fearon (2005) and Hegre et al. (2013). Starting at 1946, we approximate the 
effective length of a peace period by the number of days from the end of the last conflict up to 
two years before the beginning of the next conflict so as to avoid endogeneity and to allow for 
the post conflict reconstruction time. We then apply the definition of peace fragility in 
Sambanis (2004) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) who use a decay function of the peace period.   
Ethnic Heterogeneity or Ethnic Fragmentation is thought to have a positive influence on 
triggering conflicts.  The ideas was originally introduced by Gurr (1971) using grievance 
motives provoked by social exclusion and was further developed later by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who studied the role of ethnic dispersion or diversity. 
Others, e.g. Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Collier and Rohner (2008) and Slettebak (2012), have 
investigated the contribution of different measures of ethnic diversity. Vanhanen (1999) 
initially used the racial, linguistic and religious diversity indices to represent ethnic 
heterogeneity but these were later combined into one index to represent the overall diversity 
index.  
Rough Terrain measures the proportion of the area of the country that is mountainous and 
poorly served by roads and communication infrastructure, usually located farther away from 
where the state’s power is concentrated. Since it takes time to arrive at destinations located in 
such areas and it is more difficult to operate there, their existence is expected to have a positive 
impact as it facilitates insurgency. The idea was first introduced conceptually by Fearon and 
Laitin (1999) and Buhaug and Gates (2002), and was later quantified in the study of conflict 
by Fearon and Laitin (2003) to capture the hide-out opportunity for rebels. Since then, a 
measure of rough terrain has featured as one of the important explanatory variables which pool 
data across different countries – see, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Collier and Rohner 
(2008).  
Population is expected to have a positive impact. The main reason for this is based on the way 
a conflict is defined and requires a certain threshold of deaths in order for it to be classified as 
an armed violence against the state. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) maintain that the larger is the 
population the more likely are larger casualties. Fearon and Laitin (2003) further justify the 
positive effect of population on conflict on two other grounds: higher cost of surveillance and 
tracking suspects for the authorities and better recruitment opportunities for the opposition. 
Per Capita GDP, is used in most studies and while it is commonly believed to capture the 
effect of level of development other justifications have also been provided for its role, e.g. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that it reflects the (economic) opportunity cost of a conflict 
and Fearon and Laitin (2003) maintain that it captures the state’s sovereignty embodied in 
military capabilities. On the whole, therefore, one would expect to find a negative relationship 
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between per capita GDP and conflict.   
GDP Growth too has been commonly used, in most cases in conjunction with per capita GDP 
and intended to capture the pace of those variables whose level is explained by the latter. Its 
impact therefore is not well-defined a priori and in fact appears to be unambiguous in the 
literature. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find a negative effect and conjecture that, 
ceteris paribus, a higher is growth is likely to render conflicts more costly and therefore reduce 
the probability of starting a conflict. However, Heston (1994) and Hendrix and Glaser (2007), 
among others, have argued that poor data quality and measurement problems could undermine 
the reliability of this variable.  
[Tables 2] 
 
 The list and definition of variables which are typically used for capturing the direct effect 
of climate change are given in Table 3. It is believed that the appropriate measure should 
adequately reflect both the long-run trend in climate change as well as the short-run climatic 
volatility so as to capture the resilience building phenomenon linked to the adaptation strategies 
(see Bloomfield and Nychka, 1992; Rea et al., 2011; and Koubi et al. 2012). Therefore, while 
we shall experiment with all the variables listed in Table 3, using each as an alternative 
explanatory variable to represent the role of climate change, it might be argued that ܥ ௜ܶ,௧ or ௜ܶ,௧  
– or,  ܥ ௜ܲ,௧ or ௜ܲ,௧ – represent the long-run pattern while ܶܦ௜,௧, ∆ ௜ܶ,௧ or %∆ ௜ܶ,௧ – or, ܲܦ௜,௧, ∆ ௜ܲ,௧ 
or %∆ ௜ܲ,௧ –  better embody the short-run volatility in climate. In addition, the humidity index, 
ܪܫ௜,௧, which adjusts ௜ܶ,௧ for the impact of humidity so as to provide a more accurate measure of 
‘how hot the weather feels to the average person’ is used as an alternative to ܶ ௜,௧ and is expected 
to have a similar effect.  
[Tables  3] 
 
 Given that we wish to focus on the role of the latter, here we provide a preliminary analysis 
of their relevance. Figure 1 plots, for the countries included in the sample and over the sample 
period: (i) deviation in the average annual temperature from its last 30 years’ moving average5; 
(ii) the total number of onsets of conflicts; and (iii) total incidences of conflicts. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
 Three points are worth noting. First, the temperature deviation series is not stationary: a 
linear trend regression yields a mild but highly significant trend coefficient estimate of 0.024 
with t-ratio of 9.20, and unit root tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that series is integrated 
of first order and hence nonstationary. To further support this evidence, which indicates a long-
run pattern in climatic evolution, we also estimated the autocorrelation coefficients of the 
annual temperature deviations using  
                                                       
5 IPCC defines climate as the ‘average weather’. World Meteorological Organization (WMO) suggest the average 
should be taken over 30 years. We follow the latter method. 
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ݎ௧,௧ି௦ ൌ
∑ ൫ܶܦ௜,௧ െ ܶܦതതതത௧൯൫ܶܦ௜,௧ି௦ െ ܶܦതതതത௜,௧ି௦൯ே௜ୀଵ
ට∑ ൫ܶܦ௜,௧ െ ܶܦതതതത௧൯ଶ ∑ ൫ܶܦ௜,௧ି௦ െ ܶܦതതതത௜,௧ି௦൯ଶே௜ୀଵே௜ୀଵ
 
 
where ܶܦ௜,௧ is the annual temperature deviation from its climate level in country ݅ in year ݐ as 
defined in Table 3.  As shown in Figure 2, although  ݎ௧,௧ି௦ reduces with s, the estimates remain 
positive and statistically significant. As a result, we cannot rule out a systematic rise in the 
temperature that indicates global warming – namely, a gradual increase in the overall 
temperature of the atmosphere of Earth. Second, while we cannot reject the stationarity of the 
onset series, the incidence series too exhibits very similar characteristics to temperature 
deviation series and the corresponding linear trend regression yields a trend coefficient estimate 
of 0.253 with t-ratio of 5.46 and this non-stationarity is also supported by unit root tests.  
 Third, the simple static cointegration regression of incidence of conflicts on temperature 
deviation yields a highly significant cointegration coefficient with t-ratio of 4.3 and the Durbin-
Watson statistic of 0.5 where the hypothesis that the cointegration residual series is stationary 
cannot be rejected. Together, these results suggest that we cannot rule out the hypotheses that 
some degree of climate warming has occurred over the sample period and that there is a positive 
causal association between climate warming and armed conflicts.  
      
[Figure 2] 
 
4. Evidence  
To provide a systematic examination of the impact of climate, we shall estimate different 
versions of the following regression equation  
 
  ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ݖ௜,௧ᇱ ߚ௭ ൅ ߚ௫ݔ௜,௧ ൅ 	ߤ௥ ൅ 	ߠ௧ ൅ ߙ ൅ ݑ௜,௧, ݐ ∈ ሾ1, ܶሿ,			݅ ∈ ሾ1, ܰሿ,  (1) 
 
where ݕ௜,௧ ൌ 1  if there is an onset of internal armed conflict in country ݅ in year ݐ and ݕ௜,௧ ൌ 0 
otherwise. The explanatory variables consist of: ݖ௜,௧, the vector of  non-climate (conditioning) 
explanatory variables listed in Table 2; ݔ௜,௧, a typical climatic factor, represented by one of the 
variables in Table 3;  ߤ௥, the region fixed effect where each country in the sample is associated 
with a specific geo-political region denoted by the subscript ݎ ∈ ሾ1, ܴሿ;6 ߠ௧, the year fixed 
effect. ߙ is the constant intercept and the country-time specific disturbance term ݑ௜,௧ reflects 
all the omissions and is assumed to be independently distributed; at this stage we do not include 
a country fixed or random effect but allow for within country correlations by means of clustered 
errors.7  Given the binary form of the dependent variable, our regression equation in (1) is 
                                                       
6 We associate each country with one of the following six political regions: ‘Western Europe and the US’, ‘Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia’, ‘South and East Asia and Oceania’, ‘Central and South America’, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
and ‘Middle East and North Africa’. The proposed categorisation is intended to reflect the tendency towards 
conflict in regions.  
7 It is more sensible to cluster errors on countries rather than on regions, of which there are only six in the current 
sample, to reduce the bias in standard errors. See Nichols and Schaffer (2007) and Wooldridge (2003) for details. 
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modified to reflect the assumption that its right-hand-side determines the conditional 
probability of onset subject to an unpredictable random error, namely,  
 
ܲݎ݋ܾ൫ݕ௜,௧ ൌ 1ห൫ݔ௜,௧, ݖ௜,௧ᇱ ൯, ߤ௥, ߠ௧൯ ൌ ܨ൫ݖ௜,௧ᇱ ߚ௭ ൅ ߚ௫ݔ௜,௧ ൅ 	ߤ௥ ൅ 	ߠ௧ ൅ ߙ൯ ൅ ݑ௜,௧∗ . 
 
 Two specification issues are worth noting at the outset. First, since there is evidence in the 
literature suggesting that the long-run effect of climate tends to be nonlinear, we shall use 
quadratic form for ߚଵ௫ݔ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ௫ݔ௜,௧ଶ  when ݔ௜,௧ is one of ܥ ௜ܶ,௧, ௜ܶ,௧, ܥ ௜ܲ,௧ and ௜ܲ,௧. Second, 
although in the interest of comparability with evidence available in the literature we shall 
include GDP Growth and the logarithm of Population and Per Capita GDP, it should be borne 
in mind that the sign and significance of their coefficient estimates might be affected by their 
interdependence. More precisely, given that GDP Growth is simply the change in logarithm of 
GDP between two subsequent periods, the effect captured by including  ߚ௣ logሺܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ ൅
ߚ௚௣ logሺܩܦܲ ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊⁄ ሻ ൅ ߚ௚log	ሺܩܦܲ ⁄ ܩܦܲି ଵሻ is equivalent to that captured by using 
ߚ௣∗ logሺܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ ൅ ߚ௚ௗ௣ logሺܩܦܲሻ ൅ ߚ௚ௗ௣௟ logሺܩܦܲି ଵሻ instead, which enables the three 
parameters ߚ௣∗, ߚ௚ௗ௣ and ߚ௚ௗ௣௟ to be freely estimated. It follows that, since the restrictions ߚ௣ ൌ
ߚ௣∗ ൅ ߚ௚ௗ௣ ൅ ߚ௚ௗ௣௟,  ߚ௚௣ ൌ ߚ௚ௗ௣ ൅ ߚ௚ௗ௣௟ and ߚ௚ ൌ െߚ௚ௗ௣௟  should hold, direct estimates of ߚ௣, 
ߚ௚௣ and ߚ௚ might not exactly correspond to a priori conjectures especially if the distributed 
effect of income over the two subsequent periods, embodied in ߚ௚ௗ௣ and ߚ௚ௗ௣௟, does not 
support the underlying restriction.  
 
4.1. The main results 
We have used the logit model8 to estimate different specifications based on equation (1) and in 
Table 4 report estimates of the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the main explanatory 
variables where each columns B to L corresponds to capturing the climate effect using one of 
the variables defined in Table 3; column A does not include any climate factor as explanatory 
variable and provides a benchmark with which the estimates reported in the other columns can 
be compared. The coefficient estimates reported in column A do not change much as we move 
across columns from B to L, which is an indication of robustness of our specification strategy.  
We find that most of the non-climate variables have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. The exceptions are Per Capita GDP and GDP Growth which do not seem to play 
a statistically significant role, although coefficient estimates of the former have the correct sign. 
This anomaly was, to some extent, anticipated above and should not raise much concern since 
coefficient estimates of Population have the correct sign and are highly significant. We have 
also included (dummy) variables to represent whether a country is an oil exporter, or it has 
been affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union or by a conflict in one of its neighbouring 
countries, as well as its political regime type and geo-political region. We found that the 
corresponding coefficient estimates were on the whole insignificant and only report in Table 4 
                                                       
8 While both logit and probit models are appropriate in these circumstances, the former is less restrictive regarding 
the assumptions on the distribution function representing the conditional probability.  
10 
 
the coefficient capturing the effect of belonging to the MENA region because it is one of the 
most troubled regions: the estimated coefficient is always positive but is only statistically 
significant at 10% critical level in very few cases. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
 Turning our attention to climate variables, columns B and C show their long-run impact 
captured by the quadratic forms of ܥ ௜ܶ,௧ and ܥ ௜ܲ,௧ respectively: the AMEs have the correct sign 
– consistent with the role of climate in contributing to onset of conflict – but only temperature 
exerts a significant impact; a one s.d. rise in climate-level temperature (in Fahrenheit) raises 
the probability of conflict by 3.1 percentage points. Very similar results are obtained in 
columns D and E where we use  ௜ܶ,௧ and ௜ܲ,௧ instead. Thus, precipitation does not seem to act 
as a significant proxy for the long-term effect of climate. However, this changes when we focus 
on the short-term effect and use the deviation in climate: as shown in columns F and G, the 
AMEs associated with both ܶܦ௜,௧ and ܲܦ௜,௧ are both statistically significant with correct signs. 
But replacing deviations with changes or growth rates to capture the short- term effect reverts 
to only temperature effect being significant as shown in columns H to J. In particular, a 2% rise 
in the current temperature (equivalent to one s.d.) increases the probability of onset of conflict 
by 0.7 percentage points.  Finally, in the last column we report the role of humidity index whose 
effect turns out to be positive and significant but, as expected, its impact is lower than that of 
௜ܶ,௧, i.e. 0.015 < 0.032, since the former adjusts the latter for the impact of humidity. To 
summarise, as far as the impact of climate is concerned, measures which are based on 
temperature levels always play a positive and statistically significant role. While precipitation 
effect too always has the correct sign, it is only found to be significant when its deviation from 
the long-run climate level is used to proxy the short-run effect.  
 Based on the estimates of AMEs presented in Table 4, the annual average temperature and 
peace fragility have the highest impact followed by population size.  In other words, we find 
that controlling climate change, along with promoting political stability and regulating the 
growth of population, can be most effective in reducing the likelihood of the onset of armed 
conflicts.  
 
4.2.  A further focus climate effects 
In order to compare the quantitative impact of climate variables, in Figure 3 we show plots of 
the representative predictive margins calculated at different sample values of the relevant 
variable. These plots suggests a positive association between climate warming and the 
probability of onset of conflicts. In addition, to understand better the effectiveness of 
temperature levels, in Figure 4 we plot the AME of average annual temperature levels at 
different values which shows that the impact becomes significant at extreme heat levels.   
 
[Figures 3 & 4] 
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 To find which one of the measures used as a proxy for climate is more effective, in Table 5 
we report the AMEs based on using the actual data (rather than standardised data used in 
obtaining the estimates reported in Table 4) for those climatic factor whose effect we found to 
be significant as reported in Table 4. The results are revealing in that they highlight the 
particular effectiveness of climate control policies that target reducing the deviation of current 
temperature from the long-run: a 1o F increase above the climate average increases the 
probability of conflict by 0.8 percentage point. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
 The above results were based on the assumption that each of the two main climate factors, 
temperature and precipitation, on their own represent a good proxy. However, treating these as 
independent and using them as alternative indicators disregards the possibility that they could 
play a complementary role. For instance, Lilleør and Van den Broeck (2011) argue that the 
impact of temperature is likely to be higher in drought-prone areas. We therefore estimated a 
more general regression equation that allows for an interaction between temperature and 
precipitation on the grounds that while only one measure – on the basis of the above evidence, 
a temperature-based measure – is more likely to capture the direct effect of climate, the impact 
is bound to be influenced by the extent to which the other measure varies. We experimented 
with different specifications by keeping the sample and all other control variables intact and 
using different combinations of temperature and precipitation measures and found that data 
supports the following model  
 
  ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ݖ௜,௧ᇱ ߚ௭ ൅ ߚ%∆்൫%∆ ௜ܶ,௧൯ ൅ ߚ௉ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ 	ߚ%∆்,௉൫%∆ ௜ܶ,௧ ൈ ௜ܲ,௧൯ ൅ ߤ௥ ൅ 	ߠ௧ ൅ ߙ ൅ ݒ௜,௧.  (2) 
 
 This specification is justified on the grounds that %∆ ௜ܶ,௧ and ௜ܲ,௧, which are less likely to be 
correlated, are respectively used to capture the short-run and long-run impacts of climate, and 
their interaction provides a better reflection of the hypothesis put forward by Lilleør and Van 
den Broeck (2011) since now డ௬೔,೟డ൫%∆்೔,೟൯ ൌ ߚ%∆் ൅ ߚ%∆்,௉	 ௜ܲ,௧ and the impact of temperature 
fluctuations is enhanced in dryer climates or, put differently, a rise in precipitation moderates 
the impact of growing temperature. We found ߚመ௉ ൌ െ0.00006	ሺ0.46ሻ, ߚመ%∆் ൌ 0.166	ሺ2.60ሻ 
and ߚመ%∆்,௉ ൌ െ0.00013	ሺ1.72ሻ –  t-ratio in parentheses – thus, as expected, the direct effect 
of ௜ܲ,௧ remains insignificant but its impact upon the effect exerted by %∆ ௜ܶ,௧ is significant at 
10% critical level.  
 
4.2.  Robustness of evidence on the climate effects 
The evidence so far supports the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, the warming of climate 
significantly raises the probability of onset of conflicts. We now address a number of points 
that might throw some doubt on the reliability of this evidence by undermining its robustness. 
The first point concerns the possibility that the effectiveness of the climate factor might be 
diminishing over time. To examine this, we re-estimated the regression equations 
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corresponding to columns D and E in Table 4 over the shorter period of 1967-2011 where we 
used the current and lagged climate factors, ௜ܶ,௧ି௦ and ௜ܲ,௧ି௦, in order to check if their impact 
is reduced as ݏ rises. We present the estimated distributed lag effects in Table 6. Given that all 
regressions are estimated using an identical sample, the evidence suggests the passage of time 
does not significantly erode the climate effect.  
 
[Table 6] 
 
 The next point arises since our sample is constructed by pooling all the countries regardless 
of their climatic characteristics. This imposes the implicit restriction that the impact of climate 
is homogeneous across different climatic conditions. One way to relax this restriction is to 
divide our sample into three groups of countries in terms of their general climate, namely cold, 
mild and hot, where the mild climate is assumed to prevail when the temperature is within one 
s.d. of the sample mean; cold and hot climates then correspond to temperatures below and 
above the lower and the upper bounds of the interval. Respectively, cold, mild and hot climate 
occur in 22.6%, 66.83% and 10.56% of observations in the sample. Accordingly, we construct 
three dummy variables, denoted by ܦܥ௜,௧, ܦܯ௜,௧ and ܦܪ௜,௧ and assign them unity if the 
observation corresponds to a cold, mild and hot climate respectively and zero otherwise. Using 
these, we experimented with the following regression equation  
 
  ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ݖ௜,௧ᇱ ߚ௭ ൅ ߚ௫ݔ௜,௧ 	൅ ߛ௠ܦܯ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ௛ܦܪ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ௫௠ܦܯ௜,௧ݔ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ௫௛ܦܪ௜,௧ݔ௜,௧ ൅ ߤ௥ ൅ 	ߠ௧ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, (3) 
 
which augments equation (1) with the dummies and their interactions with the climate variable, 
ݔ௜,௧, and treats the cold climate as the baseline. Table 7 reports estimates of the ߛ௝ coefficients, 
associated with the dummies, and the interaction effects ߚ௫௝ , when ݔ௜,௧ is set to one of ܶܦ௜,௧, 
%∆ ௜ܶ,௧, ܲܦ௜,௧ or %∆ ௜ܲ,௧. Clearly, in all cases estimates of  ߛ௝ are positive and statistically 
significant: as expected, ceteris paribus, the onset of a conflict is more likely in countries with 
warmer climate and ߛො௛ ൐ ߛො௠ holds in all cases. To illustrate how the impact of climate is likely 
to evolve in each case in Figures 5 and 6 we show how the AMEs of ܦܯ௜,௧ and ܦܪ௜,௧ vary 
when evaluated at different values of %∆ ௜ܶ,௧ and ܲܦ௜,௧. These confirm the expected result that 
on the whole the effect of a rise in temperature is less substantial in cold climates compared to 
mild and hot climates. 
[Table 7 and Figures 5 & 6] 
 
 A number of studies which use cross country data (e.g. Burke et al., 2009, and Hsiang et al., 
2013) have argued in favour of replacing the country characteristics, captured in equation (1) 
above by  ߤ௥ ൅ ݖ௜,௧ᇱ ߚ௭, with country fixed effects, hence they recommend using the following 
regression equation instead, 
 
  ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ௫ݔ௜,௧ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ 	ߠ௧ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߳௜,௧, (4) 
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where ܿ ௜ is the country specific fixed effect. This approach is worth considering when assessing 
the robustness of our evidence. However, we note that the specification in (4) restricts the 
sample since all the observations pertaining to countries that did not experience any conflict 
will have to be excluded.  Besides reducing the sample size considerably (limiting the number 
of countries to 75 out of original 139) and eliminating the possibility of distinguishing between 
countries on the basis of a specific characteristic, this approach also raises the likelihood of 
introducing a sample selection problem since those countries which have experienced a conflict 
tend to have a number of common or very similar characteristics. In addition, the sample mean 
and median of ‘risks of onset’ for countries with a history of conflict are respectively 11.3% 
and 5%, which are noticeably larger than the corresponding values for the whole sample, 
namely 7.3% and 1.8% – see Table 1 above for other details.  In Table 8 we compare our 
estimates based on this approach with those based on equation (1). The set of estimates entitled 
(A) are our original estimates which can be compared with those entitled (B); climatic factors 
retain their sign and significance but, as expected, their effects are considerably larger. To make 
direct comparison between the two specifications possible, the corresponding estimates based 
on identical samples are also reported in the table, entitled (C) and (D) respectively. These 
results too support our original conclusions regarding the sign of the impacts. While there are 
certain drawbacks in using this method – which stem from eliminating important observations 
from the sample and hence over-estimating the effects and introducing sample selection bias – 
it should be noted that it could be more appropriate in situations where the focus is on countries 
with a history of conflict and/or there are data availability issues regarding the country-specific 
characteristics.  
[Table 8] 
 
 The next set of point concern the overall adequacy of our sample and estimation method. In 
this connection we consider the following main issues:9  
(i)  The ‘rare event’ characteristic of the dependent variable: King and Zeng (2001) and 
Tomz et al. (2003) discuss this problem in general and propose using an adjusted logit 
model specifically designed for estimating regression equations when the dependent 
variable measures the occurrence of a rare event. In particular, the results presented in 
King and Zeng (2001) suggest that standard logit estimates may under predict the 
probability of the occurrence such events and Tomz et al. (2003) show how their 
modified estimator yields lower mean squared errors when the dependent variable is data 
on outbreak of war, political activism or an epidemiological infection. Given that our 
dependent variable could be classified as rare-event since ݕ௜,௧ ൌ 1 only for less than 5% 
of the observations, we re-estimated equation (1) using the modified logit estimator and 
the results support our original conclusions regarding the impact of climate factors.10  
                                                       
9 The results for these modified regressions are not reported in the paper but are available from authors on request. 
10 The software is made available for Stata by Tomz et al. (2003) and can be downloaded from 
https://gking.harvard.edu/relogit.  
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(ii)  Treatment of observations corresponding to on-going conflicts: Our sample so far only 
includes those observations in which at least one new conflict has started but all the on-
going conflicts (defined as an active conflict that had started before that specific 
observation) are excluded. An alternative would be to include the latter observations too 
but treat them as ‘no conflict’. Although this modification skews the sample (since 
observations corresponding to an ‘active conflict’ are not distinguished from those 
corresponding to ‘no conflict’), it is worthwhile checking if it affects the estimated 
impact of climatic effect. We therefore re-estimated equation (1) using the modified 
sample for the climate variable ݔ௜,௧ ൌ ߚଵ் ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ 	ߚଶ் ௜ܶ,௧ଶ  as an example (whose estimates 
based on the original sample are given in column D of Table 4) and found that the results 
support our original conclusion with the estimated AME 0.0211 being statistically 
significant at 5%. 
(iii) Omission of ‘internationalised internal armed conflicts’: There is a clear distinction 
between internal and internationalised internal armed conflicts based on the definition 
introduced earlier: there is evident involvement of a foreign state in the later. It is 
therefore important to test if the presumption that internal armed conflicts that involve a 
third-party support are fundamentally different from other purely internal conflicts. We 
re-estimated equation (1) using a modified sample whose dependent variable accounts 
for both internal and internationalised conflicts but did not find any noticeable change 
in our main findings regarding the impact of climate factors.  
(iv)  Exclusion of the observations corresponding to high leverage cases: Since there are a 
number observations within the sample which could be described as ‘outliers’ and/or 
‘influential’, due to the country-specific characteristics, it is important to ensure that 
their inclusion does not skew the parameter estimates. We therefore experimented with 
two methods that deal with this problem: (i) the approach recommended in Pregibon 
(1981) that identifies and omits observations with high leverage from the sample; (ii) 
the method advocated by Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) and Hosmer et al. (2013) which 
identifies and omits observations with large residuals based on Pearson and Deviance 
residual measures. Re-estimating equation (1) after these sample modifications for the 
climate variable ݔ௜,௧ ൌ ߚଵ் ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ 	ߚଶ் ௜ܶ,௧ଶ  as an example did not alter the general 
conclusions, yielding an AME of 0.026 (statistically significant at 5%) and 0.037 
(statistically significant at 1%) for the above methods, respectively.  
(v)  Omission of potentially relevant country-specific explanatory variables: In the interest 
of maintaining a parsimonious specification, we have used a selected subset of 
explanatory variables identified in the literature. We list the additional relevant variables 
in Table 9 where for each variable we report the study which uses that variable and/or 
the corresponding source. The corresponding coefficient estimates were statistically 
insignificant and including them as additional explanatory variables did not alter the 
effect of climate variables reported above.   
[Table 9] 
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5. Summary and conclusion 
The existence of reliable information on what triggers an intrastate armed conflict is essential 
for upholding peace. While numerous studies have addressed this issue by focussing on 
quantifying the influence of different factors, there is yet no firm consensus in the literature on 
whether a worsening of climatic conditions facilitates the onset of such a conflict. In this paper 
we have focussed on the existence and robustness of an empirical relationship between 
intrastate armed conflicts and climatic factors. We have constructed a dataset for a sample of 
139 countries over the 1961-2011 period which, for each country-year observation, includes 
the relevant socio-economic, demographic, geographic and climatic measures as well as 
recording whether there has been an armed conflict. Our econometric analysis based on this 
dataset reveals that climate plays a consistent and statistically significant role once other 
relevant control variables are accounted for: rising temperature and reducing precipitation 
increase the probability of onset of internal armed conflicts, and this result holds when it is 
subjected to a battery of robustness checks. In addition, based on the estimated impacts of the 
standardised measures of different explanatory variables, represented by their corresponding 
average marginal effects on the probability of an onset, we find that the annual average 
temperature, peace fragility and population size exert the highest impact. Thus, according to 
our results, controlling climate change, protecting and promoting stability, and regulating the 
growth rate of population size are the most effective tools when targeting a reduction in the 
onset of internal armed conflicts as means of promoting peace.  
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Table 1.  Conflict data categories 
Onset of conflicts  
(ongoing treated as missing) Onset of conflicts Incidence of conflicts 
 Number %  Number %  Number % 
No conflict 5,286 95.85 No conflict 6,123 95.97 No conflict 5,286 82.85 
Minor 190 3.45 Internal conflict 229 3.59 Internal conflict 938 14.7 
Major 39 0.70 Internationalised 28 0.44 Internationalised 156 2.45 
Total 5,515 100 Total 6,380 100 Total 6,380 100 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  List of the main country-specific explanatory variables 
Variable Description Sample 
Size6 
Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Political Instability 2ିଶோௌ where ܴܵ represents a measure of regime stability1   6330 0.1077 0.2897 0 1 
Peace Fragility 2ି௉஽ ଼⁄  where ܲܦ is a measure of peace duration2 6380 0.4312 0.3770 0.0036 1 
Ethnic Heterogeneity Index Ascending from perfectly homogenous to most heterogeneous3  6380 45.5611 34.0722 0 144 
Rough Terrain Percentage of total area4 6380 2.0575 1.4418 0 4.5570 
Population Mid-year estimates (in natural logarithm)5 6377 16.002 1.5125 12.3051 21.019 
Per Capita GDP Annual, in constant 2005 US$ prices5  5719 7.6941 1.5884 3.9129 11.3138 
GDP Growth Percentage change in annual GDP in constant 2005 US$ prices5 5712 3.9967 6.8355 -64.0471 189.8299 
1.  Constructed using Polity IV data, available at http://www.edac.eu/indicators_desc.cfm?v_id=63. 
2.  Constructed using Conflict Dataset, available at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php. 
3.  Data based on combining sub-indices of racial, linguistic, and religious diversity, from Vanhanen (1999).  
4.  Data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
5.  Data from World Bank (2014).   
6.  The sample consists of 6380 country-year observations consisting of 139 countries for the period 1961-2011. The full list of countries with a conflict can be found in Table A1 
in the Appendix. However, the sample is not balanced as not all the countries existed throughout the years, e.g. the countries formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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Table 3.  Measures of climatic factors used as the explanatory variable of interest1 
Variables Notation and Description Sample Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Temperature ௜ܶ,௧:   Annual average temperature in Fahrenheit 66.1540 14.6904 18.6800 85.6400 
Precipitation ௜ܲ௧:    Annual total precipitation in mm in natural logarithm 6.6501 0.9733 2.5953 8.2095 
Climate Temperature ܥ ௜ܶ,௧: Moving averages of  ௜ܶ,௧	 of over the last 30 years 65.8012 14.7283 22.0820 83.8400 
Climate Precipitation ܥ ௜ܲ௧:  Moving averages of  ௜ܲ,௧	 of over the last 30 years 1093.597 758.2622 37.3833 3164.580 
Temperature Deviation from Climate ܶܦ௜,௧ ൌ ௜ܶ,௧ െ ܥ ௜ܶ,௧ 0.3528 0.8678 -3.4800 4.3560 
Precipitation Deviation from Climate ܲܦ௜,௧ ൌ ௜ܲ,௧ െ ܥ ௜ܲ,௧ -0.2021 163.2015 -919.5800 1340.117 
Change in Temperature  ∆ ௜ܶ,௧ ൌ ௜ܶ,௧ െ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ 0.0196 0.9753 -5.4000 5.2200 
Change in Precipitation  ∆ ௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ௜ܲ,௧ െ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ 0.0189 221.8989 -1864.200 1745.200 
Growth Rate of Temperature %∆ ௜ܶ,௧ ൌ ∆ ௜ܶ,௧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ⁄  0.0551 2.0603 -20.8655 26.0171 
Growth Rate of Precipitation %∆ ௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ∆ ௜ܲ,௧ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ⁄  3.0104 28.1862 -82.5723 471.371 
Humidity Index2 ܪܫ௜,௧:  Annual index value  22.4561 11.9048 -11.6894 40.5765 
1.  The raw data is based on daily record of temperature and precipitation and were obtained from the Climatic Research Unit (Harris et al. 2014) which provides monthly gridded fields based 
daily values and is calculated on high-resolution (0.5x0.5 degree) grids based on an archive of monthly values provided by thousands of weather stations distributed globally. ௜ܶ,௧ and ௜ܲ௧ 
country ݅ and year ݐ were calculated by matching each weather station with its host country and obtaining the corresponding annual average values for each ݅ and ݐ. The sample consists of 
6380 country-year observations for the period 1961-2011. The full list of countries with a conflict can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. However, the sample is not balanced as not all 
the countries existed throughout the years, e.g. the countries formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
2.  ܪܫ௜,௧ ൌ ܶ′௜,௧ ൅ 0.5555 ቈ6.11݁ହସଵ଻.଻ହଷ଴൬
భ
మళయ.భలି
భ
ವ೐ೢ೔,೟
൰ െ 10቉ where ܶ′௜,௧ is the Centigrade transformation of ௜ܶ,௧, ܦ݁ݓ௜,௧ ൌ ହଽ ൈ ൫ܶ′௜,௧ ൅ 459.67൯ െ
ଽ
ଶହ ൫100 െ ܴܪ௜,௧൯, and ܴܪ௜௧ is the annual 
average percentage air humidity (Masterton and Richardson, 1979). 
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Table 4. Logit estimates of equation (1) with different climatic factors: average marginal effects (AMEs) of the explanatory variables 
 
       ࢞࢏,࢚: 
A 
-- 
B 
࡯ࢀ࢏,࢚ 
C 
࡯ࡼ࢏,࢚ 
D 
ࢀ࢏,࢚ 
E 
ࡼ࢏,࢚ 
F 
ࢀࡰ࢏,࢚ 
G 
ࡼࡰ࢏,࢚ 
H 
∆ࢀ࢏,࢚ 
I 
∆ࡼ࢏,࢚ 
J 
%∆ࢀ࢏,࢚ 
K 
%∆ࡼ࢏,࢚ 
L 
ࡴࡵ࢏,࢚ 
Political Instability  0.0115*** 0.0122*** 0.0115*** 0.0121*** 0.0116*** 0.0114*** 0.0116*** 0.0115*** 0.0116*** 0.0115*** 0.0116*** 0.0117*** 
Peace Fragility  0.0300*** 0.0289*** 0.0300*** 0.0288*** 0.0298*** 0.0301*** 0.0300*** 0.0302*** 0.0300*** 0.0301*** 0.0300*** 0.0290*** 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.0147*** 0.0112*** 0.0147*** 0.0111*** 0.0149*** 0.0147*** 0.0146*** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0127*** 
Rough Terrain  0.0066 0.0154*** 0.0065 0.0157*** 0.0049 0.0069* 0.0065 0.0066 0.0065 0.0066 0.0066 0.0118** 
Population  0.0197*** 0.0222*** 0.0195*** 0.0222*** 0.0182*** 0.0194*** 0.0197*** 0.0196*** 0.0197*** 0.0195*** 0.0197*** 0.0219*** 
Per Capita GDP  -0.008 -0.0065 -0.0077 -0.0065 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0079 -0.0078 -0.0077 -0.0079 -0.0077 -0.0073 
GDP Growth  0.0026 0.00244 0.0026 0.0024 0.00257 0.00253 0.0026 0.0025 0.0026 0.0025 0.0026* 0.0024 
MENA region dummy 0.0212 0.0332* 0.0209 0.0334* 0.0273* 0.0229 0.0217 0.0218 0.0214 0.0219 0.0211 0.0285* 
Climate: ߚଵ௫ݔ௜,௧ ൅
ߚଶ௫ݔ௜,௧ଶ  -- 0.0307
*** -0.0004 0.0317*** -0.0028 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 Climate:  
ߚଵ௫ݔ௜,௧ -- -- -- -- -- 0.0068
* -0.0042** 0.0055* -0.0026 0.0071** 0.0005 0.0150** 
R2 0.2746 0.2814 0.2747 0.2819 0.2760 0.2780 0.2757 0.2760 0.2751 0.2765 0.2747 0.2781 
L -603.29 -597.66 -603.29 -597.23 -602.14 -600.52 -602.39 -602.19 -602.94 -601.76 -603.28 -600.46 
 The dependent variable is the ‘onset of an internal armed conflict’ which is a dummy set to unity if there an onset has occurred in a country during a year, and is zero otherwise.  
 Lagged values of Population, Per Capita GDP and GDP Growth are used in order to avoid introducing an endogeneity bias and allow for the time required these to exert their impact.  
 In order to facilitate comparison, all non-dummy explanatory variables are standardised so that the marginal effects reflect the impact of a one s.d. change in the value of the variables.  
 The sample size in all regressions is 4463, consisting an unbalanced combination of 139 countries over the period 1961-2011.   
 We only report the coefficient of the regional dummy associated with MENA; the base line region is Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% critical values based on standard errors clustered at the country level. ܴଶ and ܮ  are the pseudo goodness of fit measure  and 
pseudo log-likelihood values respectively. 
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Table 5.  AMEs for different climatic factors1 
Climatic 
Factor 
࡯ࢀ࢏,࢚3 ࢀ࢏,࢚3 ∆ࢀ࢏,࢚ %∆ࢀ࢏,࢚ ࢀࡰ࢏,࢚ ࡼࡰ࢏,࢚ 
 Climate Temperature 
Temperature Change in 
Temperature 
Growth 
Rate of 
Temperature 
Temperature 
Deviation from 
Climate 
Precipitation 
Deviation from 
Climate 
AME2 0.21 0.22 0.6 0.4 0.8 -0.3 
1.  See the note below Table 4. The difference between these estimates and those 
reported in Table 4 is due to use of raw rather than standardised data.  
2. These measure the impact of 1o F or 100mm rise in temperature or precipitation on 
the probability of onset of conflict.  
3. These variables appear in quadratic form as in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 6.  Comparing the AMEs of current and past temperature 
࢙: 
Climate Factor 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Temperature:  ߚଵ் ௜ܶ,௧ି௦ ൅ ߚଶ் ௜ܶ,௧ି௦ଶ  0.0305 0.0291 0.0296 0.0301 0.0292 0.0286 0.0275 
(2.40) (2.35) (2.40) (2.38) (2.35) (2.29) (2.27) 
ܴଶ 0.295 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.293 
ܣܫܥ 1228 1229 1229 1229 1229 1230 1230 
 
Precipitation:  ߚଵ௉ ௜ܲ,௧ି௦ ൅ ߚଶ௉ ௜ܲ,௧ି௦ଶ  
-0.00363 -0.00237 -0.00351 -0.00433 -0.00207 -0.00394 -0.00215 
(0.78) (0.52) (0.77) (0.92) (0.43) (0.83) (0.47) 
ܴଶ 0.290 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.288 0.290 0.288 
ܣܫܥ 1236 1237 1238 1237 1238 1236 1238 
See the notes below Table 4. The dependent variable and the set of regressors are identical to that used in Table 4, but the sample size is reduced to 4212 since we have dropped the observations 
for 1961-1966 to allow for maximum of 6 lags. The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t-ratios (standard errors are clustered at the country level). 
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Table 7.  Effect of climatic factors in different climates 
based on estimates of equation (3) 
ݔ௜,௧: ܶܦ௜,௧ %∆ ௜ܶ,௧ ܲܦ௜,௧ %∆ ௜ܲ,௧ 
ߛ௠ 0.955** 1.011** 0.977** 0.978** ߛ௛ 1.788*** 1.920*** 1.891*** 1.881*** 	ߚ௫ 0.0780 0.110** 0.00497* 0.00858 
ߚ௫௠ 0.0512 -0.0124 
-
0.00590** -0.00903 
ߚ௫௛ 0.176 0.103 
-
0.00590** -0.00719 
Constant -11.85 -11.70 -11.96 -11.87 
ܴଶ 0.2857 0.2873 0.2883 0.2852 
ܮ -594.08 -592.78 -591.96 -594.50 
 See the notes below Table 4. The dependent variable, the set of regressors and 
the sample are identical to that used in Table 4. The ‘cold’ case is used as the 
baseline.   
 This table exceptionally reports Log odds, as interpreting joint role and  
interaction terms separately, is not possible having just marginal effects. 
 
 
Table 8.  Comparing estimates of specifications (1) and (4) 
Dependent: conflict onset      
climatic factor used: ࢼ૚ࢀࢀ࢏,࢚ ൅ ࢼ૛ࢀࢀ࢏,࢚૛  %∆ࢀ࢏,࢚ ࢀࡰ࢏,࢚ ࡼࡰ࢏,࢚ -- 
 Temperature 
Growth Rate 
of 
Temperature 
Temperature 
Deviation from 
Climate 
Precipitation 
Deviation 
from Climate 
-- 
(A)  Estimates based on equation (1) with full sample, reported in Table 4; sample size: 4463 
Estimated AME 0.0317*** 0.00707** 0.00677* -0.0042** -- 
ܴଶ 0.2819 0.2765 0.2780 0.2757 0.2746 
ܮ -597.23 -601.76 -600.52 -602.39 -603.29 
AIC 1326.47 1333.53 1335.055 1334.78 1334.59 
BIC 1749.11 1749.77 1764.09 1751.02 1744.42 
(B)  Estimates based on equation (4) with reduced sample; sample size: 2678 
Estimated AME 0.21* 0.00821** 0.015** -0.0116*** -- 
ܴଶ 0.2542 0.2533 0.2558 0.2551 0.2520 
ܮ -577.9 -578.65 -576.67 -577.28 -579.67 
AIC 1251.8 1253.30 1253.35 1250.56 1253.35 
BIC 1534.66 1536.15 1547.99 1533.41 1530.31 
(C)  Estimates based on equation (1) with restricted sample; sample size: 2224 
Estimated AME 0.0374 0.0173** 0.0154* -0.00754* -- 
ܴଶ 0.1994 0.1983 0.1995 0.1966 0.1955 
ܮ -542.0861 -542.8295 -542.0183 -543.9887 -544.7094 
AIC 1216.172 1215.659 1218.037 1217.977 1217.419 
BIC 1592.838 1586.618 1600.41 1588.936 1582.671 
(D)  Estimates based on equation (4) with restricted sample; sample size: 2224 
Estimated AME 0.317* 0.0162** 0.0182** -0.00891** -- 
ܴଶ 0.2563 0.2546 0.2567 0.2535 0.2518 
ܮ -503.5323 -504.7215 -503.2512 -505.4388 -506.583 
AIC 1103.065 1103.443 1104.502 1104.878 1105.166 
BIC 1377.004 1371.675 1384.148 1373.11 1367.691 
 See the notes below Table 4. The dependent variable in all cases, the set of regressors in (A) and (C) and the sample in (A) are 
identical to that used in Table 4. The set of regressors in (B) and (D) replace the country-specific explanatory variables with 
country-specific fixed effects. The sample size in (A) and (B) is the maximum possible number of observations in each case 
and in (C) and (D) is the maximum possible common observations.    
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Table 9. Additional country-specific variables, description and source 
 Crop Production Index: annual agricultural production index, 2004-2006 = 100 – World Bank (2014)  
 Soil Quality:  share of area with suitable soil for crop production – Gallup et al. (1999) 
 Latitude:  absolute value of capital city’s latitude over 90 – La Porta et al. (1999) 
 Tropical Area: share of 1995 population living in the tropic or sub-tropic areas – Mellinger et al. (2000) 
 Tropical Region: dummy set to unity if the country is located in a tropical zone with latitudes within an interval of 23.26o from the equator – Mellinger et al. (2000) 
 Malaria: share of 1995 population exposed to risk of Malaria – Gallup et al. (1999) 
 Ethnic Fractionalisation Index: structural distance between languages as a proxy for the cultural groups in a country – Fearon (2003) 
 Ethnic Dominance: actual share of largest ethnicity in total population – Fearon and Laitin (2003) – or whether the share exceeds 45% – Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
 Language Diversity: number of languages in Ethnologue or linguistic component of – Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Vanhanen (1999) 
 Ethnolinguistic Diversity: the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different ethnolinguistic groups – Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
 Religion Diversity: component of Ethnic Heterogeneity Index – Vanhanen (1999)   
 Oil Production: oil production in metric tons – Ross (2013) 
 Oil Exports: barrels per day – Ross (2013) 
 Partially Free Polity: dummy set to unity for a country with limited respect for political rights and civil liberties – Freedom House (2013) 
 Presidential Democracy: presidential democracy system – Cheibub et al. (2010) 
 Autonomy: dummy set to unity if the country has de facto autonomous regions – Hegre and Sambanis (2006) 
 Military Personnel: number of armed forces personnel per 1000 people – World Bank (2014) 
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Figure 1.  Number of conflicts and temperature deviation from climate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample autocorrelation coefficients with 90% CIs for ࢀࡰ࢏,࢚ 
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Figure 3.   Predictive margins of selected climate variables with 90% 
confidence intervals based on the estimates reported in Table 4 
ࢀ࢏,࢚;  Column D 
 
ࡼࡰ࢏,࢚; Column G
 
∆ࢀ࢏,࢚; Column H
 
ࡴࡵ࢏,࢚; Column L
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Figure 4. AMEs of ࢀ࢏,࢚ with 90% confidence intervals 
(based on Column D of Table 4) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. AMEs of belonging of Mild or Hot climate with 90% confidence intervals 
based on estimates of equation (3) 
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Figure 6. AMEs of belonging of Mild or Hot climate with 90% confidence intervals 
based on estimates of equation (3) 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Full list of conflicts in the sample 
Y
ea
r1
 
G
W
N
O
2 
State Opposition3 
Y
ea
r1
 
G
W
N
O
2 
State Opposition3 
89 41 Haiti 
Military faction (forces of 
Himmler Rebu and Guy 
Francois) 
98 540 Angola UNITA 
91 41 Haiti Military faction (forces of Raol Cédras) 02 540 Angola FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R 
04 41 Haiti FLRN, OP Lavalas (Chimères) 04 540 Angola FLEC-FAC 
65 42 Dominican Republic 
Military faction 
(Constitutionalists) 07 540 Angola FLEC-FAC 
90 52 Trinidad and Tobago Jamaat al-Muslimeen 09 540 Angola FLEC-FAC 
94 70 Mexico EZLN 77 541 Mozambique Renamo 
96 70 Mexico EPR 67 552 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) ZAPU 
63 90 Guatemala FAR I 73 552 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) ZANU, ZAPU 
65 90 Guatemala FAR I 66 560 South Africa SWAPO 
72 92 El Salvador Military faction (forces of Benjamin Mejia) 81 560 South Africa ANC 
79 92 El Salvador ERP, FPL 85 560 South Africa ANC 
77 93 Nicaragua FSLN 71 580 Madagascar (Malagasy) Monima 
82 93 Nicaragua Contras/FDN 71 600 Morocco Military faction (forces of Mohamed Madbouh) 
89 95 Panama Military faction (forces of Moisés Giroldi) 75 600 Morocco POLISARIO 
64 100 Colombia FARC 91 615 Algeria Takfir wa'l Hijra 
62 101 Venezuela Military faction (navy) 80 616 Tunisia Résistance Armée Tunisienne 
82 101 Venezuela Bandera Roja 11 620 Libya NTC, Forces of Muammar Gaddafi 
92 101 Venezuela Military faction (forces of Hugo Chávez) 63 625 Sudan Anya Nya 
65 135 Peru ELN, MIR 71 625 Sudan Sudanese Communist Party 
82 135 Peru Sendero Luminoso 76 625 Sudan Islamic Charter Front 
07 135 Peru Sendero Luminoso 83 625 Sudan SPLM/A 
67 145 Bolivia ELN 11 625 Sudan Republic of South Sudan 
89 150 Paraguay Military faction (forces of Andres Rodriguez) 66 630 Iran KDPI 
73 155 Chile 
Military faction (forces of 
Augusto Pinochet, Toribio 
Merino and Leigh Guzman) 
79 630 Iran KDPI 
63 160 Argentina Military faction (Colorados) 79 630 Iran MEK 
74 160 Argentina ERP 79 630 Iran APCO 
72 165 Uruguay MLN/Tupamaros 86 630 Iran MEK 
71 200 United Kingdom PIRA 90 630 Iran KDPI 
1.  Years are from 1961 to 2011 and the first two digits of the year are deleted. 
2.  GWNO (Gleditsch-Ward numbers) is the most common way of identifying countries by digits (Gleditsch and Ward, 1999). 
3.  For the description of the opposition organisation see Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Harbom and Wallensteen (2012). 
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Table A1. Full list of conflicts (continued) 
Y
ea
r 
G
W
N
O
 
State Opposition 
Y
ea
r 
G
W
N
O
 
State Opposition 
98 200 United Kingdom RIRA 91 630 Iran MEK 
61 220 France OAS 93 630 Iran KDPI 
78 230 Spain ETA 96 630 Iran KDPI 
85 230 Spain ETA 97 630 Iran MEK 
91 230 Spain ETA 99 630 Iran MEK 
92 359 Moldova PMR 05 630 Iran PJAK 
89 360 Rumania NSF 84 640 Turkey PKK 
90 365 Russia (Soviet Union) Republic of Armenia 91 640 Turkey Devrimci Sol 
90 365 Russia (Soviet Union) APF 05 640 Turkey MKP 
93 365 Russia (Soviet Union) Parliamentary forces 61 645 Iraq KDP 
94 365 Russia (Soviet Union) Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 63 645 Iraq 
Military faction (forces of 
Abd as-Salam Arif), NCRC 
99 365 Russia (Soviet Union) Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 73 645 Iraq KDP 
99 365 Russia (Soviet Union) 
Wahhabi movement of the 
Buinaksk district 82 645 Iraq SCIRI 
07 365 Russia (Soviet Union) Forces of the Caucasus Emirate 87 645 Iraq SCIRI 
91 372 Georgia National Guard and Mkhedrioni 91 645 Iraq SCIRI 
92 372 Georgia Republic of Abkhazia 95 645 Iraq PUK 
92 372 Georgia Republic of South Ossetia 93 651 Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 
04 372 Georgia Republic of South Ossetia 66 652 Syria 
Military faction (forces loyal 
to Nureddin Atassi and 
Youssef Zeayen) 
93 373 Azerbaijan Military faction (forces of Suret Husseinov) 79 652 Syria Muslim Brotherhood 
95 373 Azerbaijan OPON forces 11 652 Syria FSA 
90 432 Mali MPA 75 660 Lebanon LNM 
94 432 Mali FIAA 82 660 Lebanon LNM 
07 432 Mali ATNMC 90 666 Israel Hezbollah 
90 433 Senegal MFDC 00 666 Israel Fatah, PNA 
92 433 Senegal MFDC 06 666 Israel Hezbollah 
95 433 Senegal MFDC 79 670 Saudi Arabia JSM 
97 433 Senegal MFDC 92 702 Tajikistan UTO 
00 433 Senegal MFDC 98 702 Tajikistan Forces of Khudoberdiyev, UTO 
03 433 Senegal MFDC 10 702 Tajikistan IMU 
11 433 Senegal MFDC 99 704 Uzbekistan IMU 
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Table A1. Full list of conflicts (continued) 
Y
ea
r 
G
W
N
O
 
State Opposition 
Y
ea
r 
G
W
N
O
 
State Opposition 
75 435 Mauritania POLISARIO 04 704 Uzbekistan JIG 
91 436 Niger FLAA 61 750 India NNC 
94 436 Niger CRA 66 750 India MNF 
95 436 Niger FDR 69 750 India CPI-ML 
97 436 Niger UFRA 79 750 India TNV 
07 436 Niger MNJ 82 750 India PLA 
00 438 Guinea RFDG 83 750 India Sikh insurgents 
87 439 Burkina Faso Popular Front 89 750 India Kashmir Insurgents 
80 450 Liberia Military faction (forces of Samuel Doe) 89 750 India ABSU 
89 450 Liberia NPFL 90 750 India PWG 
00 450 Liberia LURD 90 750 India ULFA 
66 452 Ghana NLC 92 750 India NSCN - IM 
81 452 Ghana Military faction (forces of Jerry John Rawlings) 92 750 India ATTF 
83 452 Ghana 
Military faction (forces of 
Ekow Dennis and Edward 
Adjei-Ampofo) 
92 750 India PLA 
86 461 Togo MTD 93 750 India NDFB 
84 471 Cameroon Military faction (forces of Ibrahim Saleh) 94 750 India ULFA 
66 475 Nigeria Military faction (forces of Patrick Nzeogwu) 95 750 India NLFT 
67 475 Nigeria Republic of Biafra 96 750 India MCC, PWG 
04 475 Nigeria Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa 97 750 India ATTF, NLFT 
04 475 Nigeria NDPVF 97 750 India KNF 
09 475 Nigeria Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad 00 750 India NSCN - IM 
11 475 Nigeria Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad 03 750 India UNLF 
09 482 Central African Republic CPJP 06 750 India NLFT 
66 483 Chad Frolinat 08 750 India DHD - BW 
76 483 Chad FAN 08 750 India PULF 
89 483 Chad Islamic Legion, Revolutionary Forces of 1 April, MOSANAT 09 750 India NDFB - RD 
97 483 Chad FARF, MDD 71 770 Pakistan Mukti Bahini 
05 483 Chad FUCD 74 770 Pakistan BLF 
93 484 Congo Ninjas 90 770 Pakistan MQM 
64 490 DR Congo (Zaire) CNL 95 770 Pakistan MQM 
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Table A1. Full list of conflicts (continued) 
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State Opposition 
67 490 DR Congo (Zaire) Opposition militias 04 770 Pakistan BLA 
06 490 DR Congo (Zaire) CNDP 07 770 Pakistan TNSM 
07 490 DR Congo (Zaire) BDK 11 770 Pakistan BLA 
71 500 Uganda Military faction (forces of Idi Amin) 75 771 Bangladesh JSS/SB 
74 500 Uganda Military faction (forces of Charles Arube) 71 780 Sri Lanka JVP 
94 500 Uganda LRA 84 780 Sri Lanka LTTE, TELO 
82 501 Kenya Military faction (forces of Hezekiah Ochuka) 89 780 Sri Lanka JVP 
65 516 Burundi Military faction (forces loyal to Gervais Nyangoma) 03 780 Sri Lanka LTTE 
91 516 Burundi Palipehutu 05 780 Sri Lanka LTTE 
94 516 Burundi CNDD 96 790 Nepal CPN-M 
08 516 Burundi Palipehutu-FNL 74 800 Thailand CPT 
96 517 Rwanda ALiR 03 800 Thailand Patani insurgents 
91 522 Djibouti FRUD 67 811 Cambodia (Kampuchea) KR 
99 522 Djibouti FRUD - AD 90 811 Cambodia (Kampuchea) FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, KR 
64 530 Ethiopia ELF 89 812 Laos LRM 
64 530 Ethiopia Ogaden Liberation Front 63 820 Malaysia CCO 
75 530 Ethiopia ALF 74 820 Malaysia CPM 
76 530 Ethiopia EPRP, TPLF 81 820 Malaysia CPM 
76 530 Ethiopia WSLF 69 840 Philippines CPP 
77 530 Ethiopia OLF 70 840 Philippines MIM 
77 530 Ethiopia SALF 93 840 Philippines ASG, MNLF 
83 530 Ethiopia OLF 97 840 Philippines CPP 
83 530 Ethiopia SLM 99 840 Philippines CPP 
91 530 Ethiopia IGLF 65 850 Indonesia OPM 
93 530 Ethiopia AIAI 67 850 Indonesia OPM 
94 530 Ethiopia OLF 75 850 Indonesia Fretilin 
96 530 Ethiopia ONLF, AIAI 76 850 Indonesia OPM 
96 530 Ethiopia ARDUF 81 850 Indonesia OPM 
98 530 Ethiopia ONLF 84 850 Indonesia OPM 
98 530 Ethiopia OLF 90 850 Indonesia GAM 
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Table A1. Full list of conflicts (continued) 
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State Opposition 
97 531 Eritrea EIJM - AS 92 850 Indonesia Fretilin 
99 531 Eritrea EIJM - AS 97 850 Indonesia Fretilin 
03 531 Eritrea EIJM - AS 99 850 Indonesia GAM 
91 540 Angola FLEC-R 89 910 Papua New Guinea BRA 
94 540 Angola FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R 92 910 Papua New Guinea BRA 
96 540 Angola FLEC-FAC     
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Table A2. Summary statistics of the variables in Tables 2, 3 and 9, based on 
subsamples by history of conflict within the sample period 
Variable 
Sam
ple 
Size 
Sam
ple 
M
ean 
Standard 
D
eviation 
M
inim
um
 
V
alue 
M
axim
um
 
V
alue 
Sam
ple 
Size 
Sam
ple 
M
ean 
Standard 
D
eviation 
M
inim
um
 
V
alue 
M
axim
um
 
V
alue 
 History of conflict No history of conflict 
Political Instability 4004 0.135 0.320 0 1 2326 0.061 0.221 0 1 
Peace Fragility  4052 0.5826 0.3632 0.0055 1 2328 0.1678 0.2249 0.0036 1 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 4052 50.945 32.174 1 144 2328 36.189 35.241 0 144 
Rough Terrain 4052 2.180 1.380 0 4.421 2328 1.844 1.520 0 4.557 
Population 4052 16.231 1.429 12.534 20.923 2325 15.602 1.570 12.305 21.019 
Per Capita GDP 3691 7.171 1.333 3.913 10.724 2028 8.646 1.573 4.424 11.314 
GDP Growth 3676 4.0058 7.5616 -64.05 189.829 2036 3.9801 5.2789 -41.8 33.991 
Temperature 4052 70.886 11.695 20.12 85.64 2328 57.917 15.704 18.68 84.38 
Precipitation 4052 1127.26 806.02 21.5 3635.8 2328 1034.4 721.27 13.4 3675.7 
Climate Temperature 4052 70.572 11.698 22.364 83.84 2328 57.498 15.742 22.082 82.37 
Climate Precipitation 4052 6.6569 1.0161 3.0680 8.1985 2328 6.6383 .89414 2.5953 8.2094 
Temperature 
Deviation from 
Climate 
4052 0.315 0.765 -2.322 4.122 2328 0.419 1.019 -3.48 4.356 
Precipitation 
Deviation from 
Climate 
4052 -2.248 161.848 -724.7 898.37 2328 3.359 165.50 
-
919.58 1340.1 
Change in 
Temperature 4052 0.017 0.847 -4.32 3.6 2328 0.024 1.165 -5.4 5.22 
Change in 
Precipitation 4052 0.265 214.39 
-
1186.3 1089.5 2328 -0.409 234.44 
-
1864.2 1745.2 
Growth Rate of 
Temperature 4052 0.038 1.536 -13.79 17.425 2328 0.085 2.744 
-
20.866 26.017 
Growth Rate of 
Precipitation 4052 2.622 24.816 -73.2 
300.45
3 2328 3.686 33.243 
-
82.572 471.37 
Humidex Index 4052 26.1561 9.8258 -10.58 
40.576
4 2328 16.015 12.453 
-
11.689 39.249 
Crop Production 
Index 4020 72.32 30.929 7.61 235.67 2291 89.768 63.566 1.35 962.57 
Soil Quality 4052 12.66 9.344 0.154 48.1481 2154 13.02 8.768 0 55.073 
Latitude 4052 0.219 0.149 0.011 0.667 2328 0.387 0.196 0.014 0.711 
Tropical Area 4052 48.353 43.365 0 100 2245 21.733 36.126 0 100 
Tropical Region 4052 0.6508 0.4768 0 1 2328 0.279 0.448 0 1 
Malaria 4052 49.673 43.679 0 100 2245 17.589 34.570 0 100 
Oil exporter 4052 0.212 0.409 0 1 2328 0.100 0.300 0 1 
Military Personnel 1893 1.697 0.785 0 4.386 1134 1.820 0.7 0.248 4.146 
  
 
